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Abstract
Corporate organization varies within a country and across countries
with country size. The paper starts by establishing some facts about
corporate organization based on unique data of 660 Austrian and Ger-
man corporations. The larger country (Germany) has larger firms
with flatter more decentral corporate hierarchies compared to the
smaller country (Austria). Firms in the larger country change their
organization less fast than firms in the smaller country. Over time
firms have been introducing less hierarchical organizations by dele-
gating power to lower levels of the corporation. We develop a theory
which explains these facts and which links these features to the trade
environment that countries and firms face. We introduce firms with
internal hierarchies in a Krugman (1980) model of trade. We show
that international trade and the toughness of competition in interna-
tional markets induce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads
to decentralized corporate hierarchies. We offer econometric evidence
which is consistent with the models predictions.
JEL Classification: F12, F14, L22, D23
Keywords: international trade with endogenous firm organizations,
trade and corporate organization in similar countries, power struggle
in the firm, corporate organization in Austria and Germany, empirical
test of the theory of the firm
1 Introduction
Corporate organization varies within a country and across countries with
country size. We establish some stylized facts about corporate organization
for two countries which are similar in many dimensions like factor endow-
ments, geography, institutions, culture, language, but market size. With
a population of 8 million Austria is one tenth the size of Germany with a
population of 82 million people.1We document the pattern of corporate orga-
nization based on unique data of 460 German and 200 Austrian corporations
in 1998-1999.2
Corporate organization appears to vary with country size. The larger
country (Germany) has firms with more decentral corporate decision making
compared to the smaller country (Austria). Table 1 provides an illustration of
this fact. In Austria, almost 40 percent of firms organize corporate decisions
centrally at the top of the organization (at the CEO level) compared to
24.4 percent of German corporations. German corporations tend to have
an internal power structure which is more cooperatively run between the
CEO and the divisional level (50.4 percent of firms in Germany compared
to 41.3 percent in Austria). Firms are ranked by their level of centralization
over several corporate decisions. The numbers in Table 1 are averages over
several corporate decisions ranging between 1 and 5 with 1 as central decision
at the CEO level and 5 as decentral decision taken at the divisional level (see
footnotes of Table 1 and the Data Appendix for a more detailed description).
1
1In 1998 Austria had an export ratio of 44.9 percent of GDP and Germany of 28.7
percent.
2For more details on the data see the Appendix and Marin (2006).
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Figure 1 and Table 3 illustrate a second fact about corporate organization
across firms within a country. The allocation of power inside the corporation
appears to vary with firm size. Larger firms tend to have a more decentral
power structure compared to smaller firms. Furthermore, the type of or-
ganization differs in a cross section of firms with around a quarter of firms
opting for the central U-form organization and around 20 percent installing
the decentral M-form organization (Table 3).
horizontal axis: level of centralization of corporate decisions, see footnotes 2 and 3 of Table 1 for defintion.
        Figure 1            Level of Centralization and Firm Size
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Table 2 unveils a third pattern of the data. Organizational change ap-
pears to vary with country size. Firms in the smaller more open economy
change their organization faster than firms in the larger less open country.
In Austria, the share of firms with a new organization (less than two years
of age) is almost twice as large compared to Germany.
less than two years
two to eight years
nine to fifteen years
more than fifteen years
 of which unchanged since foundation 30.6 16.9
33.538.3
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 660 German and Austrian firms
27.121.4
23.714.1
 Table 2                   Age of Organization in Corporations  
GermanyAustria
15.626.2
Table 3 illustrates the fourth fact. Over time, firms have been intro-
ducing less hierarchical organizations by delegating power to lower levels of
the corporation. In 1999, 26.5 percent of German firms use the central-
ized U-form organization compared to 45.5 percent before. Table 3 shows a
gradual decline since 1989 (over the last 10 years) in the importance of the
U-form organization in which power is concentrated at the top of the corpo-
rate hierarchy. Firms have been shifting towards the decentralized M-form
organization which introduces profit centers at the divisional level providing
incentives for workers at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. The impor-
tance of the M-form organization increased from 10.5 percent of firms using
it before to 20.5 percent adopting it in 1999. A similar more pronounced
trend towards less hierarchical organizations can be found for Austria.3 4
3For the distinction between the M- and the U-form organization see Williamson (1975).
4Empirical evidence on the changing nature of corporate hierarchies is scarce. Besides
anecdotal evidence in the business press there are a few studies which document these
corporate changes for US corporations see Ostermann (1996), Holmstrom and Kaplan
(2001), Rajan and Wulf (2003).
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The described features raise several questions. First, can differences in
countries’ trade exposure account for the observed corporate diversity across
countries and firms? Second, why are firms changing their mode of organi-
zation? Can an increased integration into world markets explain this trend
towards less hierarchical organizations?
In this paper we offer a model that explains these stylized facts. We
introduce firms with internal hierarchies (a CEO and a division manager) in a
Krugman (1980) model of trade under monopolistic competition. Our model
simultaneously determines firms’ organizational choices and heterogeneity
across firms in size and productivity. Moreover, in our model firms choose
their organization in response to the trade environment they face.
We develop a general equilibrium model with a monopolistic competi-
tive sector with differentiated goods that combines the Aghion-Tirole (1997)
(AT) theory of the firm with the Krugman (1980) theory of international
trade. Rather than using constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
as in Krugman (1980), we adopt the Melitz and Ottaviano (2003) frame-
work with linear demand across a continuum of varieties. This way the price
elasticity of demand is no longer exogenously fixed and changes with the
thoughness of competition in the market. Consumers have preferences over
varieties. Production of the varieties in the monopolistic sector is as in AT. A
principal hires an agent to monitor projects and workers to produce. There
are m potential methods of production of which one maximizes profits and
another one maximizes a private benefit for the agent. Hence, there is a
conflict of interest between the principal/owner and her agent as the payoffs
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of the parties depend on who’s project is implemented. The principal and
the agent gather information which of the m ways to run the firm maximizes
profits and the private benefit of the agent, respectively. If both parties find
out which are their preferred projects, the decision rights reside in the party
with formal power. If only one of the parties learns which her preferred
project is, the uninformed party always rubber-stamps this project. In this
case, the informed party has real power. In choosing between keeping formal
power or delegating power to the agent, the principal trades off the benefit
from control against the manager’s loss of initiative.
The first result of the paper states that the conflict of interest between the
principal and her agent (the power struggle in the firm) increases with the
intensity of competition in the market. When competition becomes tougher
(with an increase in the number of firms and/or with an increase in the share
of low cost firms in the market) relative profits decline between a firm in which
the agent has power (an A-firm) and a firm in which the principal decides
over the project (a P-firm). Hence, it becomes more costly to delegate power
to the agent. It matters more who runs the firm, because as competition
increases high-cost A-firms’ revenues go down by more than those of low-
cost P-firms and they try to fight the loss in revenues by lowering mark-ups
by more than P-firms.
We then solve for the industry equilibrium (imposing free entry and factor
market clearing). We find that the power struggle in firms increases the stakes
of firms and thus increases the free entry profit level that firms require to
enter the market. We find further, that the power struggle in firms affects
the corporate equilibrium that emerges in the economy. When the conflict
of interest between the principal and her agent is small, preferences over
projects between the principal and her agent are fairly congruent and the
principal invests little in information collection. Under these circumstances
the initiative of the agent can be kept alive and there are no costs of control.
Hence, principals find it optimal to keep control. On the other hand, when
the conflict of interest is large, the principal’s investment in information
collection will also tend to be large, and the agent’s initiative will be killed
even when he is given formal power. Hence, there is no gain in assigning
formal power to the agent and principals keep control. Finally, there may
exist intermediate levels of conflict in the firm for which principals find it
optimal to delegate formal power to their agents to induce them to invest in
information collection.
Next, we open the economy up to trade by examining changes in market
size. Interestingly, we find that the size of nations is an important determi-
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nant of the equilibrium mode of organization. In small countries (with little
L), competition tends to be weak and the conflict of interest between princi-
pals and managers will also tend to be small and principals tend to monitor
little. On the other hand, in large countries (with large L), competition and
the power struggle in firms are both intense and principals tend to monitor
a lot. It follows that small and large countries will tend to have firms in
which principals keep formal control, while in medium sized countries firm
organizations may prevail in which power is delegated to the manager.
Finally, we derive predictions from our model and expose them to an
econometric test. We predict that in a cross section of countries and firms,
larger countries will have tougher competition with larger more decentral
corporate hierarchies compared to smaller countries. We predict further,
that in a cross section of countries and firms, firms in larger countries more
exposed to competition will experience more intense power struggles inside
corporations. We test these predictions for a cross section of firms with
unique data of 660 corporations in Austria and Germany in 1998-1999. We
find that these predictions are not rejected by the data.
Our model builds on a new body of literature on organizations in general
equilibrium models of international trade. 5 We combine Krugman (1980)
and Melitz and Ottaviano (2003) with Aghion and Tirole (1997). This allows
us to study how international trade and the size of nations affect corporate
organization in similar countries. The paper contributes in several respects
to this literature. In their theory of the firm Aghion and Tirole (1997) as-
sume an exogenous degree of conflict in the firm. We endogenize the power
struggle inside firms by the trade environment firms face. Trade liberalization
increases the costs of delegating power to the manager, since it matters more
for profits who runs the firm. In earlier work (Marin and Verdier (2007)) we
introduce firms’ organizational choices in a Dixit and Stiglitz model of mo-
nopolistic competition. However, in this model market size and trade have
no effect on corporate organization. As is typical for a model of monopolistic
competition of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type an increase in market size
leads to an increase in the number of varieties produced without affecting
the size of firms, markups and firm organization. In this paper we incorpo-
rate endogenous markups using the linear demand system as in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2003). Markups across firms respond now to the toughness of
competition in a market. This way our model exhibits a link between trade
liberalization, firm size and the mode of organizations firms choose.
5For an overview of this literature, see Helpman (2006), Marin and Verdier (2003a),
and Spencer (2005) .
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In contrast to the present paper, we examine in Marin and Verdier (2003b)
how trade between dissimilar countries is affecting the corporate equilibrium
organization of the world economy. We introduce organizational choices in a
2x2x2 Helpman and Krugman model of international trade in which countries
differ in factor endowments. We find that relative factor endowments are im-
portant determinants of the equilibrium mode of organization. In countries
where skilled labor is relatively scarce, the wage of unskilled workers will
tend to be low, while the fixed costs of production (which consist of the wage
of the skilled manager) will tend to be high, thus making entry more costly.
As a result, the ratio of profits to the skilled wage is high in skill-scarce
countries and low in skill-abundant countries. Hence, countries with high
and low ratios of skilled workers to unskilled workers will tend to have firms
in which principals keep formal power, while in countries with intermediate
levels of relative skills power is delegated to skilled managers. We find fur-
ther that when two countries with different relative factor endowments open
up to trade, their factor prices will tend to converge and this could induce
a convergence in corporate cultures leading all principals in both countries
to delegate power (even when no principal in any of the two countries was
delegating in autarky). Surprisingly, as in MV (2003b) with North-South
trade between dissimilar countries, we find in the present paper that man-
agers empowerment and the move to flatter corporate hierarchies emerge as
an equilibrium when the world economy is governed by North-North trade
as well.
The paper is organized in the following sections. Section 2 describes the
closed economy version of the model and studies the optimal choice of firm
organization. Section 3 derives the power struggle in firms as a function of
the thoughness of competition in the market. The section then discusses the
industry equilibrium with free entry and derives the interaction between the
power struggle in firms and the equilibrium mode of organization. Section
4 opens the economy up to trade and studies the role of the size of nations
in determining the corporate equilibrium. Section 5 presents econometric
evidence supporting the view that trade and competition are explaining the
allocation of power in firms as well as the conflict of interests between prin-
cipals/owners and managers. Section 6 concludes. The proof of the main
results and the description of the data are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 The closed economy
2.1 Demand
Consider an economy with L consumers. Consumer preferences are defined
over a continuum of differentiated varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω and a homoge-
nous good chosen as the numeraire. They are given by
U = q0 + β
Z
i∈Ω
qidi−
1
2
γ
Z
i∈Ω
q2i di−
1
2
η
∙Z
i∈Ω
qidi
¸2
where q0 and qi are respectively consumption of the numeraire good and
of variety i of the differentiated good. The demand parameters β, γ and η
are positive with β and η giving the substitution between the differentiated
varieties and the numeraire good and γ as the degree of product differenti-
ation between varieties i.When γ = 0, varieties are perfect substitutes and
consumers care only about the total consumption level over all varieties given
by
Qc =
Z
i∈Ω
qidi
Let pi be the price of variety i. We assume that consumers have positive
demand for the numeraire good. Then standard utility maximization gives
the individual inverse demand function
pi = β − γqi − ηQc
whenever qi > 0. This will be the case when
pi ≤
1
γ + ηN
(γβ + ηNp)
where N is the measure of the set of varieties Ω with positive demand
and p the average price index given by
p =
1
N
Z
i∈Ω
pidi
It follows that
p = β − γ
N
Qc − ηQc = β − γ +Nη
N
Qc
Total demand for variety i can be expressed as
qi = Lqi =
βL
γ +Nη
− L
γ
pi +
Nη
γ +Nη
L
γ
p (1)
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where qi is the market demand for variety i Note that in this linear demand
system for varieties, the price elasticity of demand is driven by the ’toughness’
of competition in the market induced either by a lower average price for
varieties p or more product varieties N . The price elasticity of demand
increases with lower p and larger N .
2.1.1 Production
The numeraire good 0 is produced with constant returns to scale (one unit
of good 0 requires one unit of labor) under perfect competitive conditions.
Each variety of the differentiated good is produced under monopolistically
competitive conditions. Suppose that a given variety i is produced with
marginal cost ci, then profits for that variety can be written as
πi = qi(pi − ci)
The profit maximizing output level qi = q(ci) and price level pi = p(ci) are
related to each other by:
qi = q(ci) =
L
γ
[p(ci)− ci] (2)
or
β
γ +Nη
− 1
γ
p(ci) +
Nη
γ +Nη
1
γ
p =
1
γ
[p(ci)− ci]
Note, that output per firm increases with the size of the market L.6
The profit maximizing price can be written as
p(ci) =
1
2
∙
ci +
βγ
γ +Nη
+
Nη
γ +Nη
p
¸
(3)
with the (absolute) markup over price as
m(ci) = p(ci)− ci =
1
2
∙
βγ
γ +Nη
+
Nη
γ +Nη
p− ci
¸
(4)
Note, that in addition to the taste for variety parameter γ the markup is
now also determined by the toughness of competition in the market induced
6In the the Dixit and Stiglitz (DS) model output per firm does not depend on market
size. In the DS model a larger market increases the number of varities without changing
firm size.
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either by a lower average price for varieties p or a larger number of varieties
N .7
The average price p and average cost of firms c can be expressed as
p =
c+ βγγ+Nη
2γ+Nη
γ+Nη
(5)
c =
1
N
Z
i∈Ω
cidi (6)
Substituting (5) into (4) gives an expression for the markup m(ci):
m(ci) =
1
2
∙
2βγ
2γ +Nη
+
Nη
2γ +Nη
c− ci
¸
and for profits
π(ci) =
L
4γ
∙
2βγ
2γ +Nη
+
Nη
2γ +Nη
c− ci
¸2
Free entry into the industry ensures zero expected profits for a potential
entrant. Denote the cutoff cost level cD as
cD =
2βγ
2γ +Nη
+
Nη
2γ +Nη
c (7)
which is the cost level of a firm who is indifferent between remaining or
leaving the industry. This firm earns zero profits as its price is driven down
to its marginal costs, p(cD) = cD. Firms with cost ci < cD earn positive
profits. The cut off cost level cD captures the ’toughness’ of competition in an
industry. The cut off cost level cD declines and competition is tougher with
more firms around (with larger N), with more low cost firms in the market
(with lower c), and when varieties are closer substitutes (with smaller γ).
2.1.2 Power in the Firm
In this section, we determine the optimal choice of firm organization. We
consider a firm with a simple hierarchy consisting of a CEO (the principal P)
hiring a division manager (the agent A) to implement a project. There are ex
ante m potential and a priori identical projects (or ways to produce a good).
7This stands in contrast to CES utility used in the DS model in which markups are
fixed and exclusively determined by the taste for variety parameter γ.
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Payoffs are ex ante unknown to both parties. To make things interesting we
assume that there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.
Among the m projects, there is one which yields the highest possible benefit
B for the principal and one which yields the highest possible benefit b for
the agent.8 Let αB be the principal’s expected benefit when the agent’s best
project is implemented with (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). We assume, for simplicity, that
the agent’s expected benefit when the principal’s best project is implemented
is 0.9 α is a congruence parameter capturing the degree of conflict between
the principal and her agent. The lower α, the more is the principal’s payoff
reduced when the agent’s best project is implemented and hence the larger
the conflict of interest between the principal and her agent.
We turn now to the distinction between ”formal” and ”real power” in
the firm. B and b are supposed to be known ex ante though the parties
do not know ex ante which project yields such payoff. We assume also that,
among them projects, there are some with very high negative payoffs to both
parties, implying that choosing randomly a project without being informed
is not profitable to both agents who instead prefer to do nothing (project
0). This aspect, together with the fact that each uninformed party prefers to
rubber-stamp the other informed’s party suggestion to do nothing, implies
that private information about payoffs gives decision control to the informed
party. In this case, the informed party has ”real power” in the firm. There
are two sources of power in the firm. ”Formal power” which is allocated to
the manager by contract and ”real power” which parties may obtain by being
better informed.
Both parties may acquire information on possible ways to run the firm.
However, we assume that the CEO has managerial overload. By spending
some resource costs the principal learns the payoffs of all projects with prob-
ability E and remains uninformed with probability 1 − E. This generates
costs of information collection of gP (E) = gE
2
2
. Similarly, by exerting some
effort gA(e) = ke with e ∈ [0, e], k < b the agent learns the payoff of all
projects with probability e and remains uninformed with probability 1 − e.
We assume that the principal is risk neutral and that the agent is infinitely
risk averse with respect to income. Therefore, the agent is not responsive
to monetary incentives and he agrees to receive a fixed wage w equal to his
8In the next section B is endogenized by the intensity of competition in product
markets.
9Alternatively, one can assume that the agent receives a benefit of βb when the princi-
pal’s preferred project is implemented with (0 ≤ β ≤ 1). Here, to simplify exposition we
simply set β = 0.
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opportunity cost. His incentives to gather information on projects will be di-
rectly related to the private non pecuniary benefit b he gets from his ”best”
project.
Firms can choose between three types of organizations, a P-organization
in which the CEO/owner has formal power, an A-organization in which the
CEO delegates formal power to the agent, and an O-organization in which the
principal has formal power and in which the agent exerts minimum effort.
The O-organization can be thought of as a single managed firm (run by
the principal) without an internal hierarchy. The agent is employed but
is not doing anything useful, since the agent’s effort is assumed to be not
contractible.
We first compute the Nash equilibria in information collection and the
resulting payoffs under the P-organization and under the A-organization,
respectively. Then we examine which of these organizations yield higher
utility to the principal and is preferred by her. We postpone the analysis of
the O-organization to the next section.
P-Organization
Consider first the P-organization. Under the P-organization the principal
has formal power in the firm. The principal’s and the agent’s expected payoffs
are
uP = EB + (1− E)eαB − gP (E)− w
uA = (1−E)eb− gA(e)
With probability E, the principal becomes fully informed about her pay-
offs and picks her preferred project with monetary payoff B, while the agent
receives 0. With probability 1− E, the principal remains uninformed about
payoffs. The agent may then learn with probability e and suggest his best
project to the principal (who accepts it). The principal receives a monetary
payoff αB while the agent gets his best private benefit b. In this case the
informed agent has real power in the firm. If none of the two agents find out
which is their preferred project, production does not take place (the other
m− 2 projects yield large negative payoffs). If both agents engage in infor-
mation collection, the decision rights reside in the principal (who has formal
power).
The first order conditions of the two parties with respect to efforts E and
12
e are
Principal : B(1− eα) = gE (8)
Agent :
e = e if k ≤ b(1−E)
= 0 if k > b(1−E) (9)
The conditions highlight the trade-off between the principal’s control and
the agent’s initiative. The principal supervises more the higher her stake
in the project (the larger B), the larger the conflict of interest between the
principal and the agent (the lower α) and the lower the agent’s effort e. The
agent, in turn, has more initiative the higher her stake (the larger b) and the
lower the principal’s interference (the lower E). Thus, control comes with
the cost of loosing the agent’s initiative.
The Nash equilibrium level of efforts under the P-organization are 10
e∗P = e, and E
∗
P =
B(1− eα)
g
when B ≤ eBP (α)
e∗P = 0, and E
∗
P =
B
g
when B > eBP (α)
with eBP (α) = g(1− k/b)
1− eαeBP (α) is the threshold level of profits at which the agent’s initiative is killed
under the P-organization. For B’s above the level eBP (α), the principal exerts
the effort E∗P and kills the initiative of the agent.
A-Organization
Consider now the A-organization. In this organization the principal del-
egates formal power to the agent. The two parties’ expected payoffs are
then
vP = eαB + (1− e)EB − gP (E)− w
vA = eb− gA(e)
10There are three possible Nash equilibria in effort levels. We select the equilibrium with
the highest agent’s effort which is also the one preferred by the principal. For a discussion
of the three Nash equilibria see Aghion and Tirole 1997.
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Now the agent chooses his preferred project when informed. Under this
organization the principal is prevented from overruling the agent’s decision
when both have acquired information. When the principal is informed and
the agent is uninformed, the principal suggests her best project, which is then
implemented by the agent. In this case the principal has real power in the
firm. With b > k, the Nash equilibrium effort levels under the A-organization
are11
e∗A = e and E
∗
A =
B(1− e)
g
(10)
The advantage of delegating formal power to the agent is that the agent
has more initiative to become informed. In our specification, the agent will
always provide maximum effort under the A-organization while his initia-
tive will be killed under the P-organization for profits of the principal large
enough.12
The Choice of Firm Organization
We turn now to determine the optimal firm organization. We now ask how
the parties’ informational efforts respond to exogenous changes in the payoff
B under the P-organization and under the A-organization, respectively.13 We
solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in effort levels E∗, e∗ under each
mode of organization when profits gradually increase.
Two cases can be distinguished.
Case 1: B ≤ eBP (α)
At this profit level both firm organizations keep the agent’s initiative alive.
The utility levels of the principal under the two forms of organization
11When β > 0, we can show that there exists a threshold eBA given by
eBA = g(1− k/b)β(1− e)
such that the agent’s initiative is killed under the A-organization when B > eBA. Intu-
itively, above the threshold level eBA the principal’s stakes are so high that she acquires
information E∗A leading to a high probability of intervention which, in equilibrium, leads
to minimum agent’s effort e∗A = 0 .
12The O-organization is a P-organization with minimum effort by the agent. We post-
pone the analysis of the O-organization to the next section.
13We endogenize B by product market competition in the next section.
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are simply
u∗P = g
(E∗P )
2
2
+ e∗PαB − w and v∗P = g
(E∗A)
2
2
+ e∗AαB − w
Given that e∗P = e
∗
A = e, and that E
∗
P > E
∗
A in this regime, it follows that
u∗P > v
∗
P . Thus, the P-organization yields higher utility to the principal.
Case 2: eBP (α) < B
At this profit level, the P-organization kills the agent’s effort e∗P = 0, while
he exerts maximal effort e∗A = e under the A-organization. The principal’s
expected utilities under the two organizations, respectively are given by
u∗P =
B2
2g
− w and v∗P =
(1− e)2B2
2g
+ eαB − w
u∗P > v∗P and thus the principal prefers the P-firm over the A-firm when
B > B(α) =
2gα
2− e
B(α) is the threshold level of profits at which the principal is indiffer-
ent between loosing control while keeping the agent’s initiative as in the
A-organization and keeping control but loosing the agent’s initiative as in
the O-organization. When B > B¯(α), the principal prefers to exert control
and to loose the agent’s initiative and she opts for the O-organization.
We summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For B(α) < eBP (α) the P-organization yields higher utility
to the principal than the A-organization for all values of B.
For eBP (α) < B(α), three organizations may emerge as profits gradually
increase.
- For B ≤ eBP (α), the principal prefers the P-firm over the A-firm with
e∗P = e and E
∗
P =
B(1−αe)
g ;
- For eBP (α) < B < B(α), the A-firm yields higher utility to the principal
than the P-firm with e∗A = e and E∗A =
B(1−e)
g ;
- For B(α) ≤ B, the O-firm yields higher utility to the principal than the
A-firm with e∗P = 0 and E
∗
P =
B
g .
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Intuitively, the mode of organization matters for incentives inside the firm
at intermediate levels of profits only. At low and high profit levels there is
no trade-off between control and initiative. At low profit levels, the principal
monitors and intervenes little because her stakes are small and she cares little.
Therefore, the P-organization gives sufficient initiative to the agent. At high
profit levels, the principal’s stakes are so large that she intervenes even under
the A-organization leading to minimum effort by the agent even when he is
given formal power in the firm. Therefore, the principal might as well keep
control by choosing the O-organization. At intermediate levels of profits there
is a trade-off between control and initiative and the principal delegates formal
power to her agent to keep his initiative and the A-organization emerges as
the optimal mode of organization.
The firm’s optimal choice of organization is illustrated in Figure 2. The
B˜P (α) - curve captures the cost of having control in the firm in terms of the
loss of the agent’s initiative. The B¯(α)- curve captures the gain of having
control in terms of the firm’s/principal’s profits. From Proposition 1 we know
that for profit levels below the B˜P (α) curve the benefit of control outweights
its costs and the firm chooses the P-organization. In fact, at these levels of
profits there are no costs of control, since the agent’s initiative can be kept
alive under the P-organization. For profit levels in between the B˜P (α)- and
the B¯(α)- curve, the cost of control outweights the benefit and the firm goes
for the A-organization. For profit levels above the B¯(α)- curve, the benefit
of control again outweights its costs and the firm chooses the O-organization.
2
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3 Market Competition and Power Struggle
We incorporate now the choice of firm organization into the production side
described in section 2. We endogenize profits B and the power struggle in
firms α in this section. Recall the distinction between formal and real power
in the firm. Consider two types of firms depending on who has real (as
opposed to formal) power in the organization. Firms in which the principals’
preferred project is implemented produce the good with production cost ci =
cB. Call these firms ”real P-firms”. Similarly firms in which the agent’s
preferred project is implemented produce the good with production cost ci =
cb = ϕcB and ϕ > 1. Call these firms ”real A-firms”. The idea here is that
the agent does not always choose the cost minimizing project but rather one
that is best for him and maximizes his perks. Thus, even in a ’formal P-firm’
in which the principal keeps formal control, the agent’s preferred high cost
project may get implemented. This will happen when the principal decides
not to get informed and to rubber stamp the agent’s suggestion. This is a
’real A-firm’ in a formal P-firm equilibrium.
>From (??) we can rewrite the principal’s profits when her best project
is implemented as
B = π(cB) =
L
4γ
[cD − cB]2 =
Lc2B
4γ
[ecD − 1]2 with ecD = cDcB (11)ecD is the cost gap between firms with zero profits cD and the low cost
P-firms cB. The smaller this gap the harder it is to earn positive profits in the
market. Thus, ecD reflects the thoughness of competition that a firm faces.
The conflict of interest between the principal and her agent α can also be
expressed as a function of the cost gap ecD
α =
π(cb)
π(cB)
=
∙ecD − ϕecD − 1
¸2
(12)
The power struggle in firms becomes more intense (α becomes smaller)
with a decline in relative profits between an A-firm π(cb) in which the agent
runs the firm and a P-firm π(cB) in which the principal has power in the
firm. Relative profits between these two types of firms decline with tougher
competition (with smaller ecD), because high-cost A-firms’ revenues go down
by more than revenues of low-cost P-firms. A-firms try to fight the loss in
revenues by lowering mark-ups by more than P-firms. With more intense
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competition, it matters more who runs the firm and delegation of power to
the agent becomes more costly to firms.
To see this we express prices, output, mark-ups, and revenues of P-firms
and A-firms, respectively as a function of ecD.
qB = q(cB) = L cB
ecD − 1
2γ
while qb = q(cb) = L cB
ecD − ϕ
2γ
pB = p(cB) = cB
ecD + 1
2
while pb = p(cb) = cB
ecD + ϕ
2
rB = r(cB) =
Lc2B
4γ
¡ec2D − 1¢ while rb = r(cb) = Lc2B4γ ¡ec2D − ϕ2¢
πB = π(cB) =
Lc2B
4γ
[ecD − 1]2 while πb = π(cb) = Lc2B
4γ
[ecD − ϕ]2
mB = m(cB) = cB
ecD − 1
2
,
mb = m(cb) = cB
ecD − ϕ
2
.
Low cost P-firms set lower prices pB, produce larger outputs qB, and earn
larger revenues rB, and profits πB than high-cost A-firms ( pb, qb, rb, πb). They
also set larger mark-ups over price mB compared to A-firms mb.
The two relationships (11) and (12) describe how ecD, jointly affects profits
and the power struggle in firms. Eliminating ecD, they define a relationship
between B and α that has to be satisfied by any firm. From (11) we get
ecD = 1 + 2cB
r
γ
L
√
B
and from (12) we have ecD = ϕ−√α
1−√α
Therefore, the relationship between B and α is given by
B = bB(α) = ∙ ϕ− 1
1−√α
¸2 L
γ
c2B
4
(13)
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The construction of the bB(.) curve is described in Figure 3. The curve (PP )
in quadrant I plots equation (11) and shows how the firm’s profits B vary
with ecD (relationship 11)). The curve is positively sloped, because when ecD
declines and competition becomes tougher, profits decline as revenues and
markups become smaller. The curve (αα) in quadrant II plots equation (12)
and shows how ecD affects the conflict of interest inside firms α (relationship
(12)). The curve is positively sloped, because when ecD declines and compe-
tition becomes tougher delegating power to the agent becomes more costly
to firms and hence the conflict of interest in firms rises (α becomes smaller).
Quadrant III plots the 450-line making sure that the two curves (αα) and
(PP ) are drawn for the same value of ecD. Then the bB(.) curve is obtained
in quadrant IV which shows how α affects profits B. The curve is positively
sloped, because with an increase in ecD and α competition and the power
struggle in firms decline and firms earn higher profits. A given value of α
in quadrant IV is associated with a value of ecD in quadrant II which results
in a level of profits B in quadrant I, generating a point M on curve bB(.) in
quadrant IV.
The appendix shows that bB(.) satisfies bB(0) > 0 and bB(1) = +∞ and
is positively sloped in the space (B,α). A downward move along bB(.) is
associated with an increase in market competition (a decrease in ecD).
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3.1 Industry Equilibrium with Free Entry
We derive now the industry equilibrium in which the free entry conditions
have to be fulfilled for a given choice of firm organization. The timing of
events is as follows. In a first stage, firms decide whether or not to enter
the market and to hire an agent to monitor projects. At this stage, there
is free entry. In a second stage, firms decide who has formal power in the
organization by choosing between the formal P-firm and the formal A-firm.
In a third stage, information collection efforts are realized by the two parties
and a project is selected. This, in turn, determines who has real power in
the organization. Finally there is production, consumption and factor market
clearing.
The free entry conditions for a given choice of firm organization can be
written as Max{UP (B), UA(B), U0(B)} = w = 1 where UP (B), UA(B),
and U0(B) are the profit levels of the firm gross of the wage of the agent
under each organization P , A or O.14 The ”Max” argument in the free entry
conditions reflects the fact that each firm decides about its optimal type after
market entry. Three types of free entry equilibria are possible:
i) Equilibrium with P-organization and e∗P = e
The free entry condition in such a regime is
UP (B) = g
(E∗P )2
2
+ eαB = 1 (14)
This gives a unique positive solution BP = B∗P (α) which is the free
entry profit level that firms require to enter the market with a formal P-
organization. Obviously, an equilibrium in this regime exists if and only if
B∗P (α) ≤ eBP (α)
ii) Equilibrium with A-organization and e∗A = e.
The free entry condition in such a regime is
UA(B) = g
(E∗A)2
2
+ eαB = 1 (15)
14With the previous notation these profit levels are
UP (B) = uP + w = g
(E∗P )
2
2 + e
∗
PαB =
B2(1−αe)2
2g + eαB
UA(B) = uA + w = g
(E∗A)
2
2 + e
∗
AαB =
B2(1−e)2
2g + eαB
U0(B) = u0 + w = g
(E∗0 )
2
2 =
B2
2g
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The free entry condition gives a unique positive solution BA = B∗A(α).
An equilibrium in this regime exists if and only if eBP (α) ≤ B∗A(α) < B(α).
iii) Equilibrium with O-organization and e∗P = 0
Finally the free entry condition in this regime is
U0(B) = g
(E∗0)2
2
= 1 (16)
which gives the solution BP =
√
2g. Such an equilibrium exists when√
2g > B(α).
The labor market is automatically cleared by the output adjustment on
the numeraire good 0 which pins down the wage rate to 1.
3.1.1 Free Entry and Power Struggle
Next, we analyze how firms’ incentives to enter the market are affected by
the anticipated power struggle in firms. In terms of the model, we look at
how the equilibrium conditions for free entry for P-firms, A-firms, and O-
firms, respectively are affected by changes in α. We do this with the help of
Figure 4. Recall that the curves B∗P (α) and B∗A(α) are the free entry profit
levels that a firm requires to enter the market as a P-firm and as an A-
firm, respectively. Both curves slope down with α, since both firms revenues
increase with α and thus firms require a lower profit to enter the market.
The B∗A(α) curve lies above the B∗P (α) curve, since for any given α, firms
with an A-organization anticipate that their profits will be reduced when the
agent has power in the firm. Hence, A-firms require a larger profit to enter
the market. When preferences between principals and agents are perfectly
congruent (when α = 1) , there is no conflict of interest and the organization
of the firm stops to matter for market entry. Both types of firms will choose
the same cost minimizing project (at α = 1 the two curves collapse to the
same required profit value B∗A(α) = B
∗
P (α)).
21
3.2 Equilibrium Organization with Free Entry
Consider now the structure of organizational equilibria with free entry which
are determined in Figure 5. The figure combines the profit maximizing choice
of organization of Figure 2 and the free entry conditions of Figure 4 to analyze
the equilibrium mode of organization under free entry. The two curves B˜P (α)
andB(α) fromFigure 2 determining the optimal firm organization are plotted
as well as the two curves B∗P (α) and B
∗
A(α) from Figure 4 describing the free
entry profit levels for P-firms with agent’s effort (i.e. e = e) and for A-firms.
In addition, the horizontal line B∗0 =
√
2g is giving the free entry profit level
for O-firms.
The bold line in Figure 5 describes the nature of the free entry corporate
equilibria as a function of the power struggle in firms α. Several points are
worth noticing. First, at α = 1, the mode of organization stops to matter. At
this value of α, preferences of principals and managers are perfectly congruent
and there is no conflict in the firm. Second, with a decrease in α, the equi-
librium firm organization moves from the central P-organization with power
at the top of the organization to the decentral A-organization with power
delegated to the manager and finally to the single managed O-organization.
Typically, with an increase in α, the stakes rise and firms require a larger
level of profit B∗ to enter the market under both organizations. As the con-
flict of interest in firms rise, principals start to monitor. Initially, for large
values of α in the range of [αP , 1], the firms’ free entry stakes B∗ are no too
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high. Therefore, firms’ monitoring does not kill the initiative of agents even
under the P-organization. Hence, firms choose the latter. However, when
α goes down and the power struggle in firms increases, the required stakes
to enter the market are high enough to kill the initiative of agents under
the P-organization but not under the A-organization. There is a trade-off
between control and initiative. The A-organization emerges as a corporate
equilibrium for values of α in [α, αA]).Finally, as α decreases further ( i.e
for values of α smaller than α), the required profit level for market entry
increases further until the stakes for firms become so high that firms favor
control and loose the initiative of managers and the O-firm emerges as the
equilibrium organization.
Statement 1: When the power struggle in firms increases, the corporate
equilibrium organization moves from the central P-organization to the decen-
tral A-organization to the single managed O-organization.
3.3 Corporate Equilibrium and Competition
We are finally ready to describe the corporate equilibrium organization. This
is done in Figure 6 which explores how the free entry organizational equilib-
ria we have just derived in the previous section interact with the thoughness
of competition and the power struggle in firms. The B∗B∗ curve (derived
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in Figure 5) determines free entry profits and the profit maximizing choice
of firm organization. The B = bB(α) curve (derived in Figure 4) determines
profits, the thoughness of competition in the market as well as the power
struggle in firms. An equilibrium E =(Be, αe) is defined by an intersection
point of the two curves. Since B∗B∗ is downward sloping in α and bB(α) is
increasing in α, we show in the appendix that such an organizational equilib-
rium (Be, αe) always exists. The model is then solved recursively. Once the
equilibrium values of Be and αe and an equilibrium organizational regime
i ∈ {P,A,O} are obtained, one can derive the corresponding threshold costeciD in quadrant II of Figure 6. Similarly, the equilibrium level of monitoring
by firms Ei is obtained, from which we then compute the equilibrium av-
erage costs ci, the equilibrium number of effective firms Ni, the number of
entering firms Mi = Ni/(Ei + (1− Ei)e) and output, revenues and mark-up
levels of low costs P-firms and high costs A-firms. Finally, the labor market
equilibrium gives the output level of the numeraire good 0.
Figure 6: Corporate Equilibrium and Competition
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4 Market Size and Corporate Equilibrium
Consider now the comparative statics associated with a change in market size
L. A change in market size affects profits and the toughness of competition
between firms. This, in turn, affects the power struggle in firms and the
optimal firm organization.
The effect of a change in market size L is illustrated in Figure 7. We know
from (11) that a larger market increases firms’ profits as output per firm and
revenues increase. This is reflected by an upward shift of the (PP) curve
in quadrant I of Figure 7. At the same time a change in L does not affect
the conflict curve (αα) in quadrant II. Given that profits of high costs and
low costs firms are both directly proportional to market size, a change in L
has no direct effect on the conflict of interest α, everything else being equal.
Thus, an increase in L shifts up the curve bB(α) in quadrant IV of Figure 7.
Note also that the free entry curve B∗B∗ is not affected by a change in L
As a consequence, market size affects the equilibrium organization of
firms. An increase in L makes the equilibrium point E (intersection of bB(α)
and B∗B∗) move along B∗B∗ upward from a P-equilibrium with power at
the top of the organization to an A-equilibrium with power delegated to the
divisional level, to finally a single managed O-equilibrium regime without
internal hierarchies. Note also that with an increase in market size, α is
moving leftward along the B∗B∗ curve. Hence, the conflict of interest in
the firm increases with an increase in L. Finally, in quadrant II of Figure
7, an increase in L is increasing the toughness of competition in the market
(decreases ecD)
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7Intuitively, an increase in market size increases firms’ outputs and prof-
its, inducing firm entry, tougher competition and smaller markups. With
increased competition delegation of power becomes more costly and tends
to increase the power struggle between principals and managers (lower α).
A larger conflict of interest in firms and bigger profits, in turn stimulate
monitoring by principals (increased effort E), making it more likely that the
initiative of agents is crowded out under a central P-organization. Initially,
when the market is small, profits and the conflict of interest in firms is small.
Therefore, principals in firms monitor only little and do not kill the initiative
of agents under the P-organization. There is no trade-off between control and
initiative. Hence, firms choose the latter. However, when market size keeps
increasing and takes intermediate levels, profits, competition and the conflict
in firms become sufficiently large to kill the initiative of agents under the P-
organization. There is a trade-off between control and initiative. Principals
delegate power to agents to keep the initiative alive and the A-organization
emerges as a free entry corporate equilibrium. When market size keeps in-
creasing further profits, competition, and the power struggle in firms become
so large that principals in firms prefer control no matter what. There is again
no trade-off between control and initiative and the single managed O-firm
without agents’ effort emerges as the equilibrium organization.
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Note that when the market is neither too small nor too large there are
more than one equilibrium mode of organization. One equilibrium is the
P-organization with high agents’ effort and another is the A-organization.
These multiple equilibria arise due to a ”strategic complementarity ” among
firms at the decision stage of optimal firm organization. At an intermediate
level of market size the attractiveness between the two modes of organization
depends on the organizational decisions taken by other firms in the market.
Each firm individually would choose the A-organization at this size of the
market, since in between the curves B˜P (α) and B(α) the A-organization is
optimal. However, when the firm anticipates at this stage that all the other
firms will choose the P-organization, then, she also anticipates that competi-
tion will be tough in the market. In a P-organizational equilibrium average
costs in the industry will be low as the share of low cost firms will be larger
than in an A-equilibrium. Hence, firms anticipate that it will be hard to
survive competition with a formal A-organization. Therefore, market entry
as an A-firm is not profitable and firms’ best choice after entry will be to
choose a P-organization as well. Similarly, when firms anticipate that all the
other firms will choose the A-organization, then they expects to be viable
competitors in the market with an A-organization. The multiplicity of orga-
nizational equilibria arises due to a coordination problem among firms which
comes from the fact that firms’ choice of organization affects the toughness
of competition in the market.15
Moreover, when the organizational equilibrium shifts from P to A with an
increase in market size, the power struggle between principals and managers
may decline rather than increase. In fact, in an A-organizational equilibrium,
firms have on average higher costs of production than in a P-equilibrium.
Agents are more likely to have real power in firms in an A-equilibrium and to
implement their best ”high cost” project. This in turn reduces the toughness
of competition in the economy and hence reduces the conflict of interest in
firms. This is illustrated in Figure 8 which shows how α is affected by a
change in L. For low values of L, a P-organizational equilibrium prevails and
an increase in market size tends to reduce the value of α within that regime.
When L becomes big enough, an A-equilibrium becomes feasible and the
15Note that the coordination problem among firms disappears in small and large mar-
kets. When the market is small firm’s organizational choice has a minor effect on the tough-
ness of competition in the market, because there are only a small number of competitors.
When the market is larger competition becomes more intensive and the option to choose
the P-organization disappears. All firms in the market will choose the A-organization.
Thus, in either case, in small and large markets, there is no need to coordinate actions
among firms. For the effect of firms’ choice of organization on the nature of competition
see Marin and Verdier (2006).
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conflict in firms declines as α jumps upwards to a higher value. A further
increase in L in the A-regime again toughens competition and increases the
conflict in firms (α continues to decline). Finally, when L is increasing even
further, the O-firm emerges as the new equilibrium and α keeps declining16.
This discussion can be summarized in the following statement:
Statement 2: When the size of the market increases, the corporate equilib-
rium moves from the central P-organization to the decentral A-organization
and finally to the single managed O-firm. Within each organizational regime
(P, A or O), the conflict of interest between principals and managers in-
creases with market size. A shift in the organizational regime from P to A
at first reduces the power struggle in firms.
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5 Econometric Evidence
In this section we use unique survey data of 660 global corporations in Austria
(200) and Germany (460) to test the predictions of our theory. We first derive
the predictions from the theory. We then examine the relationship between
the allocation of power in firms and international trade. Finally, we study the
16Though it is effectively irrelevant, as in that regime, the agent never has ”real power”
(his initiative is killed).
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relationship between the power struggle in firms and the trade environment.
As predicted by the theory, we show that the allocation of power in Austrian
and German corporations and their difference described by the facts in Tables
1 to 3 of the introduction can be explained by market size and competition.
5.1 Predictions
We start by examining the relationship between international trade and firms’
mode of organization. An increase in trade is captured in our model by an in-
crease in market size L. From Figure 7 we can derive this relationship. Recall
that an increase in market size L shifts up the bB(α) curve along the B∗B∗
curve in quadrant IV. Hence, with an increase in L competition becomes
more intense (ecD declines) and the economy moves from a P-equilibrium
with power at the CEO level to an A-equilibrium with power delegated to
the division manager, to finally a single managed O-firm. Thus, we have
Prediction 1: In a cross section of countries and firms, firms will have
more decentral corporate hierarchies and face tougher competition in larger
countries.
Next, we study the relationship between trade shares and firms’ mode of
organization. Smaller economies will import more varieties from the foreign
larger economy as home consumers want to consum all varieties produced
in the world economy. Hence, smaller countries will have larger trade shares
than larger economies.17 As the number of varieties supplied by foreign firms
increases in response to trade liberalizations smaller countries will experience
a larger movement down along the bB(α)- curve in Figure 7 compared to larger
countries. This corresponds to an increase in the toughness of competition
(along bB(α) ecD declines). Hence, in smaller economies it becomes more
likely that the corporate equilibrium shifts from a central O-organization to
a decentral A-organization in response to trade liberalizations. Thus, we
have
Prediction 2: In a cross section of countries and firms, organizational
change towards less hierarchical organizations is more likely to happen in
smaller countries.
17For the relationship between trade shares and country size, see Helpman and Krugman
(1985).
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Finally, we examine the relationship between trade and the power struggle
in firms. We can derive this relationship from Figure 7 and Figure 8. In
Figure 7 an increase in L shifts up the bB(α) curve moving α leftward along the
B∗B∗curve in quadrant IV. As a result, the power struggle in firms increases
with an increase in L. Hence, we have
Prediction 3: In a cross section of countries and firms, the power struggle
between CEOs/owners and managers in firms will be more intense in larger
more competitive countries.
Lastly, we study the relationship between corporate organization and the
power struggle in firms. We can derive this relationship from Figure 8. A
shift in the organizational equilibrium from P to A leads to a decline in the
power struggle (increase in α). Thus, we have
Prediction 4: In a cross section of countries and firms, the power strug-
gle between CEOs/owners and managers will be less intense in firms with
decentral corporate hierarchies.
5.2 Specification
We start by examining the relationship between the power allocation in firms
and trade. In order to test Prediction 1 and Prediction 2 we report estimates
from regressions of the form
ln(power)ij = θ1+θ2 ln(comp)ij+θ3(nat∗compij)+θ4(nat∗expij)+θ5(#segm)ij+ ∈ij
(17)
where (power)ij is the power structure of firm i in country j and it is the
mean of several corporate decisions in firm i in country j ranked between
1 (central) and 5 (decentral) depending on whether the CEO/owner or the
divisional manager in the firm takes the decision. (comp)ij are dummy vari-
ables taking the value 1 and zero otherwise when the firm faces very many
competitors and decides not to enter the market (very many), when the firm
faces many (many) and few (few) competitors, respectively. In light of Pre-
diction 1, we test the hypothesis that θ2 > 0 and that firms decentralize de-
cision power in the corporation in more competitive environments compared
to when the firm faces no competitor. In particular, we test the hypothesis
that θ3 > 0 and that country size magnifies the effect of competition on the
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power allocation in firms.18 nation is a dummy variable taking the value 1
for the large country Germany and zero for Austria. In light of Prediction
2, we test the hypothesis that θ4 < 0 and that the smaller country with the
larger trade share is more likely to decentralize power compared to the larger
country. We test this hypothesis to account for the stylized fact given in
Tables 2 and 3 that firms in the smaller economy Austria have changed their
organization faster than firms in Germany. We proxy the trade exposure by
(exports)ij which measures exports in percent of sales of firm i in country
j. Finally, we test for θ5 > 0 and that an increase in the power struggle in
firms (measured by (#segments)ij ) leads to more delegation in the firm.19
∈ijis an error term.
Next, we examine the relationship between the power struggle in firms,
competition and market size as stated in Prediction 3 and Prediction 4. We
run a regression with the following specification
ln(#segm)ij = ∂1+∂2 ln(comp)ij+∂3(nat∗compij)+∂4 ln(pow)ij+∂5(nat∗pow)ij+ ∈ij
(18)
where (#segments)ij is a proxy for the power struggle in firms. It mea-
sures corporate diversification of firm i in country j and gives the number
of business segments in the corporation. We assume that the power struggle
in firms increases with the number of business segments in the corporation.
The idea here is that the CEO/owner’s overload increases with more divi-
sions and with more divisional managers to deal with making it more likely
that agents have real power in more diversified firms.20 In light of Prediction
3 we test the hypothesis that ∂2 < 0 and that firms reduce the number of
business segments with more competition. When the market environment
becomes more unfriendly delegation of power becomes more costly and fewer
business segments can be sustained in firms. We assume that CEOs/owners
take control by reducing the number of business segments and by becoming
more specialized.21 We also include (nation∗competition) to test ∂3 < 0 and
that country size makes this effect stronger. To test Prediction 4 we include
18This follows directly from Figure 7 where larger countries have tougher competition
and hence have steeper bB(α)- curves than smaller countries.
19This follows from Figure 5 and Statement 1.
20In the corporate finance literature this is discussed as the ’diversification discount’.
For one explanation of the inefficiency of conglomerates, see for example Rajan, Servaes
and Zingales (2000).
21Conglomerates have been viewed by many as inefficient and many business consultan-
cies argued for a return to ’core competencies’. For a review of this literature see Bolton
and Scharfstein (1998).
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ln(power) in the regression. We expect that ∂4 > 0 and that more busi-
ness segments can be sustained in less hierarchical firms. Finally, we include
nation ∗ ln(power) in the regression to test for the interaction. As L and the
corporate equilibrium have opposing effects on the power struggle in firms,
we cannot a priori sign the interaction between ln(power) and (nation) (or
alternatively between ln(power) and (competition)).
5.3 The Data
We conducted a survey of 660 global corporations in Austria (200 firms)
and in Germany (460 firms) in the period 1997-2001. Due to the length of
the questionnaire, we personally visited the firms in Austria and Germany,
respectively or conducted the interviews by phone. The data include all pub-
licly traded German DAX firms. The data consist of the organizational part
of a full population survey of global corporations in Austria and Germany
investing in Eastern Europe. The firms included in the sample are global
corporations in the sense that they at least have two subsidiaries outside
Austria and Germany, respectively. The organizational data of the sample
are unique in several dimensions. They include detailed information on the
internal organization of the corporations such as power relations between the
CEO and the divisional level, organizational form, incentive system used for
its workers, wages and educational qualifications of the firm’s workers, de-
tailed data on the financial structure as well as balance sheet information.
Table A3 of the data appendix gives summary statistics of all the variables
used in this paper.22
The left-hand side variable power of equation (17) is obtained from the
question ’Who decides over the following issues concerning your corpora-
tion, headquarter or the divisional manager, please rank between 1 (central
decision taken at the headquarter) and 5 (decentral decision taken at the divi-
sional level)?’ The survey then lists 16 (Germany) and 13 (Austria) corporate
decisions which are ranked by headquarter of the corporation including the
decisions over acquisitions, financial decisions, decisions over new strategy,
decisions over transfer pricing, decisions to introduce new product, decisions
over R&D expenditures, decisions over budget, decisions over product price,
decisions over wage increase, decision of firing of personnel, and decision of
hiring a secretary.23 Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix give a complete
22For more information on the data see Marin (2006).
23In some cases it was ranked by the divisional level, when the firm is a very large
conglomerate. In this cases the interview was conducted at the divisional level.
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list of the ranking of these decisions in the corporate hierarchy. The vari-
able power is the mean over the 16 (13) corporate decisions ranking for an
individual firm ranging between 1 and 5. A firm with a mean of 1 has all
16(13) decisions centrally organized with power at the top of the organiza-
tion and a firm with a mean of 5 has these decisions decentrally organized
with power at the divisional level. As can be seen from Tables A1 and A2
the corporate decisions exhibit a robust ranking in the two countries. The
decisions over acquisitions and the financial decisions tend to be taken at the
top of the corporation in firms in both countries, while the decisions over
R&D expenditures and the decisions to introduce a new product tend to be
shared between the headquarter and the divisional manager.
The left hand side variable #segm of equation (18) is obtained from the
question ’How many business segments do you have in the corporation?’.We
followed the firms’ own definition of a business segment. This implies that
the level of aggregation of what constitutes a business segment varies across
firms. In our sample the number of business segments varied between 0 (e.g
for a holding company without a production unit) and 14 segments.
The right hand variables comp and worldcomp are subjective measures of
competition as perceived by firms. They are obtained from the question ’How
many competitors do you face on your local (Austrian or German) market
and worldwide, respectively?’ Firms tend to face many (269) or few (253)
competitors (out of 630 firms) on local markets, while they face many (447)
and few (112) competitors worldwide. No firm is a monopolist either locally
or worldwide, while some firms did not find it profitable to enter the local
market (76 firms) or the world market (48 firms). Since many of these firms
are multi product firms, the subjective measure of competition is an average
description over the firms’ product range. The variable exports measures
the trade exposure of firms and it is the ratio of firms’ exports to firms’
sales. The export ratio varies between zero and 285 percent. Due to intra-
firm trade in intermediate goods across locations the firms’ export ratio can
exceed 100 percent.24 The variable link is obtained from the question ’What
link exist between the business segments of your corporation - a technical link
(input-output relation between the segments), a financial link (cash flow of
one segment finances an other segment), an economic link (similar market
knowledge)?’ The variable link is ranked between 1 and 5 with 1 (perfect
link) and 5 (no link). The link is perfect (1) when the firm consist of only one
24The new division of labor in the world economy has led to the emergence of countries
as supertraders with export ratios exceeding 100 percent. A similar phenomenon can be
observed at the level of global firms involved in the new international division of labor.
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business segment, 2 when the business segments in the firm have a technical,
financial as well as economic link, 3 when only two out of the three links
are present, 4 when only one out of the three links are present, and 5 when
there is no link between business segments. The variable difqual indicates
whether or not the products of the firm are differentiated in quality. Only
43 firms out of 683 responded that this is the case.
5.4 Results
We test the predictions for a cross section of 660 corporations in Austria
and Germany. We first examine the relationship between the power alloca-
tion in firms, competition and market size. Table 4 presents ordinary least
squares estimates of equation (17). In columns 1 to 6 we examine the ef-
fect of competition in the home market. In columns 1 to 3 we include the
dummy competition and an interaction between competition and ln(cash)
to test for θ2 > 0 and θ3 > 0. We interact competition with ln(cash) to
see whether larger more profitable firms in larger markets change the effect
of competition on the power allocation in firms. Alternatively, we interact
competition with the country dummy nation in columns 4 to 6 to test for
the same effect .
In contrast to what we expect, the estimated coefficients on competition
itself are negative and significant (except for very competitive environments
where very many tends to become insignificant and turns signs) suggesting
that firms tend to centralize power with more competition compared to mar-
kets in which the firm faces no competitor (columns 1 to 3). We proceed
by interacting competition with ln(cash). The estimated coefficients on the
interaction of competition with ln(cash) are positive and significant (except
for very many) suggesting that in larger more profitable markets a tougher
competitive environment induces CEOs to place corporate decision power
more decentrally at the divisional level. The estimated coefficients of about
0.065 imply that competition increases the average rank of corporate deci-
sions in the firm by 0.065. The average rank of corporate decisions of 2.81
(see Tables A1,A2 and A3) increases by about 0.065 to 2.875.
A somewhat similar picture emerges when ln(cash) is replaced by the
country dummy nation in columns 4 to 6. Now very many competitors
has a significant negative coefficient, while many and few competitors turn
sign and become insignificant. The estimated coefficients on the interaction
term with nation are positive and mostly significant. They also tend to
be larger compared with the interaction with ln(cash). The estimated coeffi-
cients range between 0.168 and 1.107 increasing the average rank of corporate
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decisions between 2.978 and 3.917. This is an increase of up to one rank in
the range of 1 to 5 indicating that competition has a quantitative important
effect on firms’ decision to decentralize power in the corporation.
In columns 7 to 12 we turn to competition in world markets. We replace
localcompetition by worldcompetition to examine whether the relationship
between competition and power in the firm changes when firms face com-
petitors on world markets rather than on their home market. The results
are shown in columns 7 to 9 for the interaction term of competition and
ln(cash) and in columns 10 to 12 for the interaction of competition and
the country dummy nation. Competition alone turns insignificant in all
specifications when firms face foreign competitors. However, the estimated
coefficients on competition∗ln(cash) and on competition∗nation are positive
and significantly different from zero at the 1% and 5% significance level in
most specifications. They also tend to be larger compared to the estimated
coefficients on localcompetition. The results suggest that in their decision
over decentralizing power in the corporation, firms respond stronger to for-
eign compared to local competitors. Columns 4 to 6 and columns 10 to 12
support the claim of Prediction 1 that firms in larger countries with more
competition will have more decentral corporate hierarchies.
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Next, we include ln(export)ij∗nation to test Prediction 2 that θ4 < 0. The
estimated coefficients are consistently negative and significant at conventional
levels independent of specification. Finally, we include ln(#segments)ij to
test for θ5 > 0. We indeed find a positive and highly significant coefficient
. We provide instrumental variables estimates of columns 2, 5, 8, and 11
when ln(#segments)ij is included in the regressions in Table A4 of the Ap-
pendix to account for the fact that the conflict variable ln(#segments)ij is
endogenous in the model. We find similar, but somewhat weaker results
when we instrument (#segments)ij.with technical link.The latter is a good
instrument for the former because both are positively correlated (firms tend
to have more business segments when there is a technical link between the
segments), while technical link appears not to be correlated with (power)ij.
Table 5 reports OLS estimates of equation (18) for a cross section of 660
firms in Austria and Germany. Columns 1 and 2 test for ∂2 < 0. We find
that when faced with more foreign competitors firms reduce the number of
business segments by roughly 1 segment when competition is intense. The
relationship weakens when competition becomes less tough and stops to be
significant at conventional levels when the firm faces few competitors. In
columns 1 and 2 we include the country dummy nation to see whether conflict
in the firm is affected by the size of nations. Nation by itself turns out to be
insignificant. We therefore interact nation with world competition to test
for ∂3 < 0 . The results are shown in column 3. The estimated coefficients
on world competition ∗ nation are negative and are now significant for all
levels of competition, while world competition itself becomes insignificant
We proceed to include ln(power) in the regression to test Prediction 4
that ∂4 > 0 in columns 2 and 3. ln(power) is positive and highly signifi-
cant. We then interact ln(power) with nation (and alternatively with world
competition) to test for the null ∂5 = 0 in columns 5 and 4. ln(power)∗nation
and ln(power) ∗ world competition.are both highly significant at the 1 and
5 percent level rejecting the null of ∂5 = 0. Nation is significant and turns
negative when nation is interacted with ln(power) rather than with world
competition.
We also include ln(link) to control for whether there is a link between the
business segments in the firm. We assume that the stronger the link between
business segments the more business segments can be kept without leading
to the CEO’s/owner’s overload and loss of real power. The data confirm that
this is indeed the case.
To check for robustness we provide instrumental variables estimates of
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columns 2 and 3 in Table A4 of the Appendix when ln(power) as an en-
dogenous variable is included in the regressions. We use difquality as an
instrument for power as both are positively correlated (decentralization of
power appears to coincide with product differentiation) and difquality is
little correlated with the number of business segments. The results become
somewhat weaker, but remain valid. Overall, the data do not reject the claim
of Predictions 3 and 4 that the power struggle in firms increases in larger more
competitive markets and becomes less intense when firms are less hierarchi-
cally organized.
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6 Conclusion
Can differences in countries exposure to trade account for the observed differ-
ences in corporate organization across countries and firms? Can an increased
integration into the world economy explain the trend towards less hierarchical
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organizations in rich countries? We have developed a model that combines
the Krugman cum Melitz and Ottaviano model of trade with the Aghion and
Tirole theory of the firm to answer these questions raised in the introduc-
tion. Our model traces a link between the size of nations, competition and
corporate organization which can account for the facts identified in the in-
troduction. We derive predictions from our model which we test with unique
survey data of global corporations for two countries.
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Appendix B
• Proof of Properties of bB(α). Available from the authors upon request
• Proof of Existence of (Be, αe) equilibrium. Available from the authors
upon request.
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